Who said pain is the passion of the soul

Consequently it is clear that pleasure and pain belong to the appetite. Now every appetitive movement or inclination consequent to apprehension, belongs to the intellective or sensitive appetite : since the inclination of the natural appetite is not consequent to an apprehension of the subject of that appetite , but to the apprehension of another, as stated in the I ; I Since then pleasure and pain presuppose some sense or apprehension in the same subject, it is evident that pain, like pleasure, is in the intellective or sensitive appetite.

Again every movement of the sensitive appetite is called a passion , as stated above I-II and I-II : and especially those which tend to some defect. Consequently pain, according as it is in the sensitive appetite , is most properly called a passion of the soul : just as bodily ailments are properly called passions of the body. Hence Augustine De Civ. Dei xiv, 7,[8 [Quoting Cicero] reckons pain especially as being a kind of ailment. Reply to Objection 1.

We speak of the body, because the cause of pain is in the body: as when we suffer something hurtful to the body. But the movement of pain is always in the soul ; since "the body cannot feel pain unless the soul feel it," as Augustine says Super Psalm Reply to Objection 2.

We speak of pain of the senses, not as though it were an act of the sensitive power; but because the senses are required for bodily pain, in the same way as for bodily pleasure. Reply to Objection 3. Pain at the loss of good proves the goodness of the nature , not because pain is an act of the natural appetite , but because nature desires something as good , the removal of which being perceived, there results the passion of pain in the sensitive appetite.

Article 2. Whether sorrow is the same as pain? It would seem that sorrow is not pain. For Augustine says De Civ. Dei xiv, 7 that "pain is used to express bodily suffering.

Therefore sorrow is not pain. Further, pain is only in respect of present evil. But sorrow can refer to both past and future evil : thus repentance is sorrow for the past, and anxiety for the future. Therefore sorrow is quite different from pain. Further, pain seems not to follow save from the sense of touch.

But sorrow can arise from all the senses. Therefore sorrow is not pain, and extends to more objects. On the contrary, The Apostle says Romans : "I have great sorrow [ Douay : 'sadness'] and continual pain [ Douay : 'sorrow'] in my heart," thus denoting the same thing by sorrow and pain. I answer that, Pleasure and pain can arise from a twofold apprehension, namely, from the apprehension of an exterior sense; and from the interior apprehension of the intellect or of the imagination.

Now the interior apprehension extends to more objects than the exterior apprehension: because whatever things come under the exterior apprehension, come under the interior, but not conversely.

Consequently that pleasure alone which is caused by an interior apprehension is called joy , as stated above I-II : and in like manner that pain alone which is caused by an interior apprehension, is called sorrow. And just as that pleasure which is caused by an exterior apprehension, is called pleasure but not joy ; so too that pain which is caused by an exterior apprehension, is called pain indeed but not sorrow. Accordingly sorrow is a species of pain, as joy is a species of pleasure.

Augustine is speaking there of the use of the word: because "pain" is more generally used in reference to bodily pains, which are better known , than in reference to spiritual pains. External sense perceives only what is present; but the interior cognitive power can perceive the present, past and future. Consequently sorrow can regard present, past and future: whereas bodily pain, which follows apprehension of the external sense, can only regard something present.

The sensibles of touch are painful, not only in so far as they are disproportionate to the apprehensive power, but also in so far as they are contrary to nature : whereas the objects of the other senses can indeed be disproportionate to the apprehensive power, but they are not contrary to nature , save as they are subordinate to the sensibles of touch.

Consequently man alone, who is a perfectly cognizant animal, takes pleasure in the objects of the other senses for their own sake; whereas other animals take no pleasure in them save as referable to the sensibles of touch, as stated in Ethic. Accordingly, in referring to the objects of the other senses, we do not speak of pain in so far as it is contrary to natural pleasure: but rather of sorrow, which is contrary to joy.

So then if pain be taken as denoting bodily pain, which is its more usual meaning, then it is contrasted with sorrow, according to the distinction of interior and exterior apprehension; although, on the part of the objects, pleasure extends further than does bodily pain. But if pain be taken in a wide sense, then it is the genus of sorrow, as stated above. Article 3. Whether sorrow or pain is contrary to pleasure? It would seem that sorrow is not contrary to pleasure.

For one of two contraries is not the cause of the other. But sorrow can be the cause of pleasure; for it is written Matthew : "Blessed are they that mourn, for they shall be comforted. Further, one contrary does not denominate the other. But to some, pain or sorrow gives pleasure: thus Augustine says Confess. Further, one contrary is not the matter of the other; because contraries cannot co-exist together.

But sorrow can be the matter of pleasure; for Augustine says De Poenit. On the contrary, Augustine says De Civ. Dei xiv, 6 that " joy is the volition of consent to the things we wish: and that sorrow is the volition of dissent from the things we do not wish.

Therefore pleasure and sorrow are contrary to one another. I answer that, As the Philosopher says Metaph. Now the form or species of a passion or movement is taken from the object or term.

Consequently, since the objects of pleasure and sorrow or pain, viz. Nothing hinders one contrary causing the other accidentally : and thus sorrow can be the cause of pleasure. In one way, in so far as from sorrow at the absence of something, or at the presence of its contrary, one seeks the more eagerly for something pleasant: thus a thirsty man seeks more eagerly the pleasure of a drink, as a remedy for the pain he suffers.

In another way, in so far as, from a strong desire for a certain pleasure, one does not shrink from undergoing pain, so as to obtain that pleasure. In each of these ways, the sorrows of the present life lead us to the comfort of the future life. Because by the mere fact that man mourns for his sins , or for the delay of glory , he merits the consolation of eternity.

In like manner a man merits it when he shrinks not from hardships and straits in order to obtain it. Pain itself can be pleasurable accidentally in so far as it is accompanied by wonder, as in stage-plays; or in so far as it recalls a beloved object to one's memory , and makes one feel one's love for the thing, whose absence gives us pain.

Consequently, since love is pleasant, both pain and whatever else results from love, forasmuch as they remind us of our love, are pleasant. And, for this reason, we derive pleasure even from pains depicted on the stage: in so far as, in witnessing them, we perceive ourselves to conceive a certain love for those who are there represented. The will and the reason reflect on their own acts, inasmuch as the acts themselves of the will and reason are considered under the aspect of good or evil.

In this way sorrow can be the matter of pleasure, or vice versa, not essentially but accidentally : that is, in so far as either of them is considered under the aspect of good or evil. Article 4. Whether all sorrow is contrary to all pleasure? It would seem that all sorrow is contrary to all pleasure. Because, just as whiteness and blackness are contrary species of color, so pleasure and sorrow are contrary species of the soul's passions.

But whiteness and blackness are universally contrary to one another. Therefore pleasure and sorrow are so too. Further, remedies are made of things contrary to the evil. But every pleasure is a remedy for all manner of sorrow, as the Philosopher declares Ethic. Therefore every pleasure is contrary to every sorrow.

Further, contraries are hindrances to one another. But every sorrow hinders any kind of pleasure: as is evident from Ethic.

Therefore every sorrow is contrary to every pleasure. On the contrary, The same thing is not the cause of contraries. But joy for one thing, and sorrow for the opposite thing, proceed from the same habit : thus from charity it happens that we "rejoice with them that rejoice," and "weep with them that weep" Romans Therefore not every sorrow is contrary to every pleasure. I answer that, As stated in Metaph. Now a form may be generic or specific.

Consequently things may be contraries in respect of a generic form, as virtue and vice ; or in respect of a specific form, as justice and injustice. Now we must observe that some things are specified by absolute forms, e. Accordingly in those things that are specified by absolute forms, it happens that species contained under contrary genera are not contrary as to their specific nature : but it does not happen for them to have any affinity or fittingness to one another.

For intemperance and justice , which are in the contrary genera of virtue and vice , are not contrary to one another in respect of their specific nature ; and yet they have no affinity or fittingness to one another. On the other hand, in those things that are specified in relation to something extrinsic, it happens that species belonging to contrary genera, are not only not contrary to one another, but also that they have a certain mutual affinity or fittingness.

The reason of this is that where there is one same relation to two contraries, there is contrariety; e. The term passion connotes an attraction toward an agent, and it is the appetitive part of the soul, rather than the apprehensive part, that is drawn toward the things that affect the body.

So in those things which approach the First Perfect Being--viz. And so, too, in the higher part of the soul--viz. This points to a difference in the corporeal transmutations that lead to apprehension on the one hand and affection on the other. Bodily organs, insofar as they are involved in sentient apprehension , are modified with respect to those intentional properties by virtue of which they are able to play a role in sentient cognition, whereas the bodily changes relevant to sentient appetition are modifications of the natural properties of bodily organs, e.

So even though sentient apprehension and sentient appetition both involve acts of corporeal organs, they differ from one another because they are related to different properites of those organs. So a passion of the soul is materially a corporeal change, effected by some object, which i is received in a bodily organ with respect to its natural properties ["for example, one says that 'anger is an inflammation of the blood around the heart'"] and which ii is formally ordered back toward the object as it exists in itself.

Nonetheless, there are immaterial appetitive acts of will which have effects similar to the effects of the passions, even though they are non-corporeal and hence not themselves passions. For instance, an angel can have joy gaudium though not sense pleasure, and higher love dilectio though not sense-love. Question On the differences among the passions 23, St.

Thomas here begins his taxonomy of the eleven basic passions, which takes up the whole of question He cites three principles of division: A. The first division art. The second division art. The third division art. Given these parameters, plus the added note that anger has no contrary art. These passions all presuppose a concupiscible inclination toward the sensible good in question or away from the sensible evil in question: 1a.

But it is by no means clear what Descartes means by mind-body union, and in particular, what sort of metaphysical status the union has.

In his rather exasperated correspondence with Regius, Descartes maintains in no uncertain terms that mind and body form an ens per se , that is, a genuine entity in itself, rather than a merely accidental conglomeration such as the per accidens entity formed out of conjoining me with the tree on which I lean Descartes to Regius, December , AT III , CSMK So, the mind-body union is a unity in the sense that it is an individuable entity with some kind of determinate nature.

Does that mean that it counts as a substance — a third kind of substance — albeit a composite one? But that union does give the embodied human a specific nature. And so, admitting this third kind of substance makes room to attribute specific modes to it, modes that would otherwise be tricky to locate, since they seem to modify both mind and body.

The passions are just such straddling modes; they can only be understood as modifications of a being that is both bodily and mental. But taking the union as a third kind of substance comes with its own costs. In positing the real distinction between mind and body, Descartes cites their very different essences, which give them incompatible, even contradictory features e.

There is an explanatory difference between operations of the mind and operations of the body that must be recognized and respected when addressing the passions: there is no separate and irreducible science of the embodied human being.

Drawing from the history of the term unio substantialis and from other places where Descartes talks about mereological wholes that are not substances, they argue that Descartes has the tools to treat the mind-body union as having its own genuine nature, without committing to a trialism of substance see , Chapter 6, especially pp.

Still, Descartes himself remains pretty quiet about any general strategy for individuating unities other than his stripped-down ontology of substances, attributes and modes.

This is in marked contrast to, e. So, there seems some reason for the metaphysical status of mind-body union to remain vexed. However we understand the ontology, what does seem clear is that the experience of the passions, as well as other bodily-based perceptions such as sense-perceptions, provides a phenomenology of union: our sense-perceptions, appetites and passions enable us to experience ourselves as embodied humans, spatially located relative to extended, sensible objects and interacting with them.

The experience, Descartes emphasizes, is pre-reflective experience, vivid, but confused, and irreducible to those distinct ideas that have been distilled through and refined for the understanding see Alanen As such, we should not expect to be able to explain the experience away through a process of clarifying and distinguishing its components. The notion of the union is primitive for the experience of the passions and other body-based perceptions, and also required for their defense.

Here, again, the passions seem a particularly exemplary kind of the rich, clear, yet not fully distinct experience Descartes has in mind. The passions present their objects in relation to the embodied human, e. Embodiment itself also may become the object of a passionate love and care when, say, bodily health elicits love and joy in the soul.

The Passions of the Soul may not be a completely satisfactory explanation of mind-body union, but it does provide the definition Elisabeth asked for, as well as an intricate taxonomy of the passions, a description of their bodily causes, effects and function, and an account of the pursuit of virtue that addresses the means and extent to which we can regulate the passions.

But since actions, such as volitions, can themselves be perceived, Descartes prefers to restrict the term to those perceptions caused by the body. Referring them to the soul allows him to distinguish passions from other bodily-based perceptions, such as the sense-perceptions we refer to external objects. The physiology of the passions is an important component in the accounts of the causes, effects, functions and regulation of the passions.

Each of the main passions receives a detailed description of the bodily changes that accompany it, such as changes in color, body temperature, facial expression, disposition of the limbs and the like, which can in turn be attributed to the movements of the spirits and heart.

For further discussion of this topic, see the related entry Descartes and the Pineal Gland. But the pineal gland can be moved by many different causes. For this reason, Descartes admits that many other kinds of perceptions and volitions stand in close causal and experiential relations to the passions proper. These have the soul as their cause, and so are properly speaking, volitions, but they are also affective states, and in embodied creatures like us are they may be difficult to disentangle from bodily-based passions.

Although he does not deny that each passion has some distinctive felt character, Descartes offers no description of it other than the presentation of the object under some evaluative description and its effect on the will. Passions are not judgments, since judgments require an act of the will to affirm or deny. But they do have complex, propositional-like contents: through the passion of fear, I perceive that an oncoming train is dangerous to me, viz.

It is because these contents are evaluative that the passions will be motivating in ways that are normally functional. And each of these passions, except for wonder, have a built-in direction of motion, either appetitive or aversive depending on how they evaluate their objects — a feature that serves as an important organizing principle for Descartes.

On this basis, Descartes opposes love to hatred, and joy to sadness. Desire has no opposite, since it comprises both appetites and aversions.